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This article takes stock of the basic notions of Information Structure 
(IS). It first provides a general characterization of IS — following 
Chafe (1976) — within a communicative model of Common Ground 
(CG), which distinguishes between CG content and CG management. 
IS is concerned with those features of language that concern the local 
CG. Second, this paper defines and discusses the notions of Focus (as 
indicating alternatives) and its various uses, Givenness (as indicating 
that a denotation is already present in the CG), and Topic (as specify-
ing what a statement is about). It also proposes a new notion, 
Delimitation, which comprises contrastive topics and frame setters, 
and indicates that the current conversational move does not entirely 
satisfy the local communicative needs. It also points out that rhetorical 
structuring partly belongs to IS. 
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1 Introduction 
The basic notions of Information Structure (IS), such as Focus, Topic and 
Givenness, are not simple observational terms. As scientific notions, they are 
rooted in theory, in this case, in theories of how communication works. Hence 
this paper necessarily will make certain theoretical assumptions, without going 
into great details. I will motivate the selection of IS notions in the tradition of 
Chafe (1976) who talked about IS as a phenomenon of information packaging 
that responds to the immediate communicative needs of interlocutors. I do this 
within the model of communication as continuous change of the common 
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ground (CG), where it will be crucial to distinguish between CG content and 
what I will call CG management.  
 IS is a vast topic of research that has been pursued within different theo-
retical frameworks, and has produced numerous empirical insights. This short 
paper cannot conclusively argue for its choices in detail, vis-à-vis other theoreti-
cal options, or attempt to motivate them by considering phenomena in a wider 
range of languages. In spite of this, I hope that a coherent and attractive theoreti-
cal landscape emerges for IS research.  
2 Preliminaries 
2.1 What is Information Structure? 
In his seminal 1976 paper on notions of IS, Chafe introduced the notion of 
packaging of the information conveyed in an utterance that, to my mind, still 
provides useful guidance for our understanding of IS. Chafe wisely restricted his 
notion of IS to those aspects that respond to the temporary state of the ad-
dressee’s mind, thus excluding several other aspects of messages, like reference 
to long-term background knowledge, choice of language or level of politeness 
that otherwise could be understood as packaging as well. 
 One problem with Chafe’s approach is that there are aspects of optimiza-
tion of the message that, on the one hand, respond to the temporary state of the 
addressee’s mind, but on the other also affect the message itself, and hence can-
not be treated as pure packaging. For example, Focus, as expressed by sentence 
accent in English, can be used for information packaging, as in answers to ques-
tions, cf. (1), but can also lead to truth-conditional differences, as when 
associated with focus-sensitive particles like only, cf. (2). 
(1) a.  A: What did John show Mary? 
B: John showed Mary [the PICtures]F. 
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 b.  A: Who did John show the pictures? 
B: John showed [MAry]F the pictures. 
(2) a.  John only showed Mary [the PICtures]F.  
 b.  John only showed [MAry]F the pictures. 
 
The truth conditions of B’s answers in (1) arguably are the same, whereas the 
truth conditions of  
(2) differ. One and the same linguistic device, sentence accent, can be used for 
packaging as well as for constructing the content. There are two possible ways 
of dealing with this multiple use of features such as accent: One is to assume 
that the two uses of the same feature are essentially unrelated, just as the uses of 
accent in English to express focus and to distinguish words such as REcord and 
reCORD. The other is to assume that the feature is to be interpreted in a particu-
lar way that makes sense for the purposes of information packaging and of 
building information content. For methodological reasons the second alternative 
appears to be more attractive: If it can be shown that one and the same interpre-
tation of a feature has multiple uses, then this option should favored over the 
assumption of multiple interpretations. We will see that focus indeed can be in-
terpreted in this way. 
2.2 Common Ground: Content and management 
If we are to talk about communication as transfer of information and its optimi-
zation relative to the temporary needs of interlocutors, it is useful to adopt a 
model of information exchange that makes use of the notion of Common 
Ground. The original notion of CG (cf. Stalnaker 1974, Karttunen 1974, Lewis 
1979) saw it as a way to model the information that is mutually known to be 
shared and continuously modified in communication. This allowed for a promis-
ing way of modeling the distinction between presuppositions, as requirements 
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for the input CG, and assertions or the proffered content, as the proposed 
change in the output CG. This distinction is relevant for information packaging, 
as the CG changes continuously, and information has to be packaged in corre-
spondence with the CG at the point at which it is uttered. For example, it can be 
explained why (3.a) is fine but (b) is odd: In (a), the first clause introduces the 
information that the speaker has a cat, to which the presupposition of the second 
clause appeals. This contrasts with (3.b), as the second sentence introduces the 
information that the speaker has a cat which is already present in the input CG at 
this point (cf. van der Sandt 1988). 
(3) a.  I have a cat, and I had to bring my cat to the vet. 
 b. # I had to bring my cat to the vet, and I have a cat.  
 
Already when the notion of CG was introduced, it was pointed out that speakers 
could change CG by accommodation of presupposition. That is, uncontrover-
sial facts could be added implicitly to the CG by requiring the input CG to be of 
a certain kind. This is why (4.a) is good but (b) is bad: 
 (4) a.  I had to bring my cat to the vet because it was sick. 
 b.  I had to bring my gorilla to the vet because it was sick. 
 
The notion of CG had first been applied to factual information, but it soon got 
extended to discourse referents (in particular, by Kamp 1981 and Heim 1982). 
That is, CG does not only consist of a set of propositions that is presumed to be 
mutually accepted (or the conjunction of this set, one proposition), but also of a 
set of entities that have been introduced into the CG before. Such entities can be 
explicitly introduced, e.g. by an indefinite NP, or they can be accommodated, as 
in  (4.a). They can be taken up by pronouns, as in the second clause of  (4.a), or 
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by definite NPs, which express requirements to the input CG. The choice of ana-
phoric expression depends on the recency of the antecedent, again a notion that 
falls squarely within Chafe’s notion of packaging.  
  The properties of CG mentioned so far all had to do with the truth-
conditional information in the CG, so we can subsume them under the heading 
of CG content. But any ecologically valid notion of CG must also contain in-
formation about the manifest communicative interests and goals of the 
participants. For example, questions typically do not add factual information to 
the common ground, but indicate informational needs on the side of one partici-
pant that should be satisfied by a conversational move of the other. I propose to 
call this dimension of the common ground CG management, as it is concerned 
with the way the CG content should develop. Just as CG content, CG manage-
ment is supposed to be shared, with the understanding that the responsibility for 
it may be asymmetrically distributed among participants. There is a wide variety 
of studies that can be captured under the notion of CG management, some for-
mal such as Merin (1994) or Groenendijk (1999), some less formal such as 
Clark (1996) and studies of Conversational Analysis such as Hutchby & Woof-
fitt (1988). The distinction between CG content and CG management is 
important for our purposes, as we can associate those aspects of IS that have 
truth-conditional impact with CG content, and those which relate to the prag-
matic use of expressions with CG management.  
2.3 Expressions and what they stand for 
Before we discuss specific notions of IS, I would like to mention a terminologi-
cal problem. We often find that the distinction between an expression and what 
it stands for, its denotatum, is not made. For example, in a sentence like (5), the 
expression as for the beans, or the beans, may be called the ‘topic’ of the sen-
tence, but also the beans themselves are called its ‘topic’ sometimes. 
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(5)  As for the beans, John ate them. 
 
For some reason, this confusion of expression and meaning occurs particularly 
often for IS notions. For notions like ‘subject’, ‘predicate’ or ‘direct object’ it 
does not arise; no one would claim that John the person is the grammatical sub-
ject of (5), it is John the noun phrase. The imprecision of IS terms can be 
endured if one is aware of it. But in any instance in which it is relevant, it is im-
portant to make the intended interpretation clear. For example, we can speak of 
(as for) the beans as the ‘topic constituent’ of the sentence, or as a ‘topic expres-
sion’, and of the beans that it refers to, or of the discourse referents anchored to 
them, as the ‘topic referents’ or ‘topic denotation’. 
3 Focus 
3.1 What is Focus? 
The most successful understanding of focus, to my mind, is the following defini-
tion, which will presently be rendered more precise. 
(6)  Focus indicates the presence of alternatives that are relevant for the 
interpretation of linguistic expressions. 
 
This is the central claim of Alternative Semantics (Rooth 1985, 1992).1 The 
rather general definition does not say anything about how focus is marked; in 
fact it is compatible with different markings. However, it demands that we 
should only use terms like ‘focus marking’ or ‘focus construction’ to indicate 
that alternatives play a role in interpretation. It might well be that different ways 
of focus marking signal different ways of how alternatives are exploited; e.g. fo-
cus marking by cleft sentences often signals an exhaustive interpretation that in-
                                         
1  But it is not necessarily tied to the precise representation of focus that this theory proposes. 
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situ focus lacks. We can then speak about subtypes of focus, such as cleft focus 
and in-situ-focus that may employ the alternatives in more specific ways. Also, 
(6) allows for languages to differ in the ways they mark focus and in the specific 
interpretational effects of focus. This is in no way different from other linguistic 
categories, such as case or gender. But it seems reasonable, and consistent with 
current uses of the term, to use ‘focus’ exactly in those cases that satisfy (6).2 
The following sections will show that all current uses of the term can be 
subsumed under (6).  
3.2 Expression focus and denotation focus 
Definition (6) is silent about the nature of the alternatives that are relevant for 
interpretation. In fact, the alternatives may be alternatives of form or of denota-
tion. This suggests the following way to make (6) more precise: 
(7)  A property F of an expression @ is a Focus property iff F signals  
(a) that alternatives of (parts of) the expression @ or  
(b) alternatives of the denotation of (parts of) @  
are relevant for the interpretation of @. 
 
I call the first case, (a), expression focus. The expression alternatives can affect 
a variety of aspects, like choice of words and pronunciation, and they do not 
even have to involve constituents or meaningful units. Focus on expressions is 
typically used for corrections, and often, but not necessarily, comes with an 
overt negation (cf. Horn 1985 on metalinguistic negation). Two examples: 
(8)  Grandpa didn’t [kick the BUcket]F, he [passed aWAY]F. 
                                         
2  It should be pointed out that there are cases in which alternatives that are not indicated by 
focus play a role. For example, the standard theory of scalar implicatures assumes that they 
arise due to alternatives to an expression ordered by a Horn scale, and these alternatives do 
not have to be focused. For instance, John or Mary will come implicates that not both of 
them will, as or has and as its alternative, but clearly, or does not have to be focused.  
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(9)  A: They live in BERlin. 
B: They live in [BerLIN]F! 
 
In (8) the relevant alternatives of both foci are the expressions {kick the bucket, 
pass away}. It cannot be their denotations, as they are identical, the property 
DIE. The expressions differ, among other things, in their connotations, which is 
the feature in which they are contrasted here, so what is contrasted cannot just 
be their denotation. In (9) the relevant alternatives are the expressions {BERlin, 
BerLIN} that only differ in their accent and speaker B corrects speaker A by 
supplying the form that B thinks has the right accent structure.  
 Expression focus is typically marked in-situ, not by clefts or other types 
of movement. It can focus on constituents below the word level, and it can be 
deeply embedded within a sentence. This follows from the assumption that 
expression focus affects surface representations of linguistic objects. The typical 
use of expression focus is the rejection of a string [!1…!i,F…!n] in favor of a 
string [!1… !I,F"…!n], where focus identifies the substring to be replaced and 
its replacement. 
 I will call the second case, (b), denotation focus. Here, the relevant alter-
natives are construed on the level of denotations, leading to alternative 
denotations of complex expressions. Denotation focus on an expression ! with a 
meaning ||!|| leads to the assumption of a set of alternative meanings that play a 
role in the interpretation of the constituent in which ! occurs. The alternative 
denotations have to be comparable to the denotation of the expression in focus, 
that is, they have to be of the same type, and often also of the same ontological 
sort (e.g., persons or times), and they can be more narrowly restricted by the 
context of utterance. 
 In the following, I will concentrate on denotation focus, which is certainly 
more important in communication.  
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3.3 Semantic vs. pragmatic uses of focus: CG content vs. CG management 
We now turn to the notion of interpretation of the linguistic expression j that 
figured in definition (7). It is useful to explicate this notion within the general 
theory of Common Ground (CG) introduced in section 2.2, where we also intro-
duced the distinction between CG content and CG management. This 
differentiation is useful to distinguish between two quite different uses of focus: 
So-called pragmatic uses of focus relate to the common communicative goals 
of the participants, the CG management, whereas so-called semantic uses of fo-
cus relate to the factual information, the CG content.  
 The pragmatic use of focus does not have an immediate influence on truth 
conditions, but it helps in guiding the direction into which communication 
should develop, and it also aids in building the cognitive representations that are 
to be constructed by the interlocutors. Failing to select the right focus typically 
results in incoherent communication. The semantic use of focus, on the other 
hand, affects the truth-conditional content of the CG. Failing to set focus right 
will result in transmitting unintended factual information. The two uses of focus 
cannot always be neatly separated, but there are prototypical cases that clearly 
belong to one or to the other category, to which we now turn.  
3.4 Pragmatic uses of focus 
The classical pragmatic use of focus is to highlight the part of an answer that 
corresponds to the wh-part of a constituent question (Paul 1880). This can be 
captured in a straightforward way within our model of CG change.  
 A question changes the current CG in such a way as to indicate the com-
municative goal of the questioner. Following Hamblin (1973) we can model this 
effect by interpreting a question as a set of propositions, each being the denota-
tion of a congruent answer. 
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(10)  A: Who stole the cookie? 
   Hamblin meaning: {STOLE(COOKIE)(x) | x # PERSON} 
 
The answer identifies one of these propositions and adds it to the CG content; 
this is the job of the ‘ordinary meaning’ in Alternative Semantics. Focus induces 
alternatives that correspond to the Hamblin meaning of questions; in the theory 
of Rooth (1992), the alternative set is a superset of the question set: 
(11)  B: [PEter]F stole the cookie. 
   Ordinary meaning of the answer: {STOLE(COOKIE)(PETER)} 
   Focus-induced alternatives: {STOLE(COOKIE)(x) | x # ENTITY3} 
 
The formation of the question, as well as the construction of the focus-induced 
alternatives of the answers, clearly belongs to CG management, not to CG con-
tent. The question specifies the way in which the CG should develop in the 
immediate future; the answer relates an expression to the immediately preceding 
context. Obviously, focus in answers is an information-packaging device in the 
sense of Chafe, as it corresponds to the current CG, and the formation of ques-
tions, as a device of CG management, can be seen as part of information 
packaging as well.  
 We might ask at this point why there is marking of question-answer con-
gruence in the first place. Its raison d’être most likely is that it allows to 
accommodate the meaning of the questions that are not overtly expressed. That 
is, it allows to accommodate CG management. For example, the accent structure 
in (12) can be understood in such a way that the second clause leads to the ac-
commodation of a question, what did you do first. 
                                         
3  The focus is not restricted to PERSON, different from the question (10), in which the wh-
word who enforces this restriction. 
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(12)  I built a St. Martin’s lantern with my kids. First, I [built the BOdy of the 
lantern with some CARDboard paper]F. 
 
A variety of theories have assumed that coherent discourse is structured by such 
implicit questions (e.g. Klein & von Stutterheim 1987, van Kuppevelt 1994, 
Roberts 1995, Büring 2003), and focus on the answers to such explicit questions 
may well help the addressee to construct what the intended questions were.4 Un-
der this understanding, all cases of so-called ‘presentational’ or ‘information’ 
focus which is claimed to express the most important part of the utterance, or 
what is new in the utterance, can be subsumed under the use of alternatives to 
indicate covert questions suggested by the context. The following examples 
suggest questions like What happened?, What was there?, and What did she 
do?, which explains the types of foci suggested for the second clauses.  
(13) a.  And then something strange happened. [A MEterorite fell down]F.  
 b.  Once upon a time, there was [a PRINcess]F. 
 c.  Mary sat down at her desk. She [took out a pile of NOTES]F. 
 
Other pragmatic uses of focus are to correct and confirm information. In cases 
like (14.B,Bm) the focus alternatives must include a proposition that has been 
proposed in the immediately preceding CG. It is expressed that among the alter-
natives the ordinary meaning is the only one that holds. This leads to a 
corrective interpretation in case the context proposition differed, cf. (B), and to a 
confirmative interpretation in case the context proposition was the same, cf. (Bm). 
                                         
4  It should be stressed that we should not expect this use of focus to be universal; just as 
some languages use gender information to express pronoun binding and others do not, the 
use of focus to mark Q/A-coherence may be restricted. Findings about languages such as 
Hausa (Hartmann & Zimmermann, to appear) and Northern Sotho (Zerbian 2006) suggest 
that this is the case. 
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In the latter case, the wider CG must be such that other alternatives are under 
consideration as well, which are then excluded. Again, focus in this use restricts 
the possible contexts, and presumably aids interpretation.  
(14)  A: Mary stole the cookie. 
B: (No,) [PEter]F stole the cookie! 
Bm: Yes, [MAry]F stole the cookie. 
 
Another pragmatic use of focus is in highlighting parallels in interpretations. 
This can affect whole clauses as in (15.a) or parts of clauses as in (b). As in the 
previous cases, focus creates alternatives, with the pragmatic requirement that 
some of these alternatives are also evoked in the immediately surrounding con-
texts. In addition, the parallel expressions are required to have the same set of 
alternatives. In the case of (15.a), both clauses evoke the set {STOLE(x)(y) | x,y # 
ENTITY}. In the case of (b), the alternatives have to be constructed more locally, 
for which Rooth (1992) introduces an anaphoric operator C, which would 
presumably figure at the level of the NP or DP here. The NP-level alternatives 
are {P(FARMER) | P#NATIONALITY}, a set of predicates like AMERICAN(FARMER), 
CANADIAN(FARMER), etc.  
(15) a.  MAry stole the COOkie and PEter stole the CHOcolate. 
 b.  An AMErican farmer talked to a CaNAdian farmer,... 
 
The use of focus to express parallel structures is perhaps one of the least under-
stood aspects of focus. Focus appears to be less obligatory here than in the other 
cases. Presumably focus assists in constructing mental models of the described 
scene by associating the contrasted meanings. 
 Yet another pragmatic use of focus is to make the addressee aware of a 
delimitation of the utterance to the constituent in focus. This use subsumes, in 
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particular, cases of contrastive topics such as John in I will come back to this in 
section 6.2. 
(16.a), but also focus in frame setting expressions as in (b). I will come back to 
this in section 6.2. 
(16) a.  As for JOHN, he was seen in the KITchen. 
 b.  In MY opinion, JOHN stole the cookies. 
 
With these types (answers, including selections from a list of items specified in 
the question, corrections, confirmations, parallels, and delimitation) we have 
covered the main pragmatic uses of focus. We turn to those uses of focus that 
have an immediate truth-conditional effect, that is, that directly influence CG 
content. 
3.5 Semantic uses of focus 
We say that semantic operators whose interpretational effects depend on focus 
are associated with focus. The best-known cases are focus-sensitive particles 
like only, also and even. There exists a variety of theories for the meaning of 
such particles, but they generally resort to the notion of alternatives, which, as 
we have seen above, also is central for the pragmatic uses of focus. In the case 
of exclusive particles like only, it is stated that the focus denotation is the only 
one among the alternatives that leads to a true assertion; additive particles like 
also express the presupposition that the assertion holds for other alternatives; 
and scalar particles like even presuppose that the denotation of the focus con-
stituent is extreme when compared to other alternatives (cf. e.g. Jacobs 1983, 
König 1991).  
 But do these particles indeed affect the truth-conditional meaning? It is 
interesting to note that the focus information of additive and scalar particles does 
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not affect the output CG, but rather restricts the input CG, as the alternatives are 
used to impose presuppositions. In particular, additive particles are close to a use 
within CG management, as they indicate that a proposition with an alternative to 
the item in focus had been expressed before or is part of the CG. 
(17)  [JOHN]F stole a cookie, and [PEter]F, TOO,
5 stole a cookie.  
 
Negation has been analyzed as a focus-sensitive particle as well. Presumably 
these cases can be subsumed under corrections, and hence they might rather be-
long to the CG management use of focus. In the following example, it is negated 
that Bill stole the cookie, with the contextual requirement that precisely this has 
been claimed or appears to be inferable.  
 (18)  Not [BILL]F stole the cookie, but [JOHN]F. 
 
But there are a number of clear cases in which alternatives are used for semantic 
purposes. For example, reason clauses as in (19), a variation of a counterfactual 
example of Dretske (1972), or operators like fortunately necessarily contrast al-
ternatives with each other. 
(19)  Clyde had to marry [BERtha]F   in order to be eligible. 
Clyde had to [MARry]F Bertha   for the inheritance. 
(20)  Fortunately, Bill spilled [WHITE]F wine on the carpet.  
 
For example, (20) says that among the two alternatives, JOHN SPILLED RED WINE 
and JOHN SPILLED WHITE WINE, the latter one was more fortunate (but of course 
that wine was spilled at all was still unfortunate).  
                                         
5  As for a theory that explains accent on too, cf. Krifka (1999).  
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 Rooth (1985) has suggested that focus helps in determining the restrictor 
of quantifiers, in particular adverbial quantifiers, and then has truth-conditional 
impact as well. For example, focus has truth-conditional impact in (21); focus on 
q instead would result in the different, and false, reading that every u is followed 
by a q. 
(21)  In English orthography, a [U]F always follows a q.  
‘Whenever a q follows an {a, b, c, d, … z}, then it follows a u.’ 
 
One important fact about focus-sensitive operators is that they have to be in a 
position in which they can scope over their focus. For example, only in (22) 
could associate with Mary, with Sue, with introduced or with the whole VP, but 
not with John as it does not c-command John on any level of representation.  
(22)  John only introduced Mary to Sue.  
 
Yet it should be stressed that the notion of focus does not coincide with the no-
tion of scope. For example, while the focus of only in (23.a) and (b) is the same, 
their scopes differ, leading to distinct interpretations. 
 (23) a.  Mary only said that JOHN stole a cookie. 
‘Mary didn’t say of anyone but John that he stole a cookie.’ 
 b.  Mary said that only JOHN stole a cookie. 
‘Mary said that nobody but John stole a cookie.’ 
 
It is conceivable that semantic uses of focus can be traced back to pragmatic 
uses. The underlying idea is as follows: The notion of alternatives to what is said 
was first introduced for pragmatic purposes, to convey additional meanings by 
making explicit that certain expressions were considered but not uttered, pre-
sumably because they were false or not informative enough. Once established, 
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alternatives were used for operators that, due to their meaning, required refer-
ence to sets of denotations. In some cases, like additive particles and contrastive 
negation, this change from pragmatic exploitation of alternatives to semantic 
exploitation appears to be quite plausible; in other cases, as in (20) and (21), the 
details of such a development are considerably less clear. Such change from 
pragmatics to semantics is a common phenomenon that can be observed in the 
development of word meaning (cf. Levinson 2000 for pragmatically induced 
changes) and the semantization of implicatures (cf. Chierchia 2004). 
 It might be suggestive to distinguish between pragmatic and semantic fo-
cus by stating that the latter type of focus associates with an operator, while the 
former does not. But then we can assume illocutionary operators such as asser-
tion or denial that make use of the alternatives introduced by focus, and we can 
say that focus is bound to such operators (cf. Jacobs 1984), hence this is not a 
valid criterion to distinguish between pragmatic and semantic uses.  
3.6 Comparison with alternative notions of focus 
The notion of focus has been explicated in a variety of ways, in particular as 
‘highlighting’ the ‘most important’ or ‘new’ information in an utterance. While 
such explications are intuitively appealing and may apply to a majority of cases, 
I consider them unsatisfactory as definitions. The notion of highlighting is a par-
ticularly unclear one that is hardly predictive as long as we do not have a 
worked-out theory of what highlighting is. I am also not aware of any worked-
out theory of communication that has made clear what ‘importance’ means, let 
alone one that has introduced a graded notion of importance. Even on an intui-
tive level, the notion of importance is difficult to apply. In which sense is John 
the most important part in (24)? Isn’t it most important that someone else stole 
the cookie? 
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(24)   It wasn’t JOHN who stole the cookie.  
 
As for the third, the notion of ‘newness’ has been defended most often in quite 
different frameworks, ranging from Halliday’s ‘information focus’ (cf. Halliday 
1967) to the Prague school (Sgall et al. 1986) and to Jackendoff (1972). But it 
clearly gives us wrong predictions. There are many cases in which a constituent 
that refers to something previously mentioned is in focus. One might say that 
what is new in (25) is not John, or the expression John, but the information that 
John satisfies the description x stole the cookie.  
(25)  A: Who stole the cookie, John or Mary? 
B: JOHN stole the cookie.  
 
When Jackendoff (1972) defines as ‘information focus’ the information that is 
not shared by speaker and addressee, then we must say something like the fol-
lowing: It is shared information in (25) that John or Mary stole the cookie. The 
difference to what the sentence says, that John stole the cookie, is a more spe-
cific proposition. But not just any more specific proposition would do; it must be 
one that is more specific in a particular dimension, indicated by the focus. This 
leads to the idea that focus indicates an existential presupposition (cf. Geurts & 
van der Sandt 2004). If we have a sentence with a focus […!F…] then this sen-
tence comes with the presupposition $x[…x…], where x replaces the denotation 
of ! in the representation of the denotation of […!F…]. For example, (24) and 
(25) presuppose that someone stole the cookie, and in many other types of uses 
of focus we plausibly can assume existence presuppositions. But existence pre-
suppositions do not arise with every use of focus, as in the following examples: 
(26)   Not even [MAry]F managed to solve the problem.  
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(27)  A: Who, if anyone, has solved this problem? 
B: [NO one]F solved this problem. 
 
If focus indicates the presence of alternatives, as suggested here, we can see why 
the other explanations made sense to some degree. The focus denotation typi-
cally feels highlighted because it is contrasted with the other alternatives; the 
selection of this denotation over alternative ones is often felt to be the most im-
portant contribution in a sentence; and the selected alternative is often also new 
(not mentioned previously). Also, in many cases it is already established in the 
CG content that the proposition applies to one alternative, but it is still open to 
which one. But this does not mean that highlighting, importance, newness, or 
presupposition of existence should figure in the definition of focus. They are sta-
tistical correlatives, but not definitional features, of focus. Using them to define 
focus is similar to using the notion of definiteness to define subjects: The great 
majority of subjects in running text are definite, but in many languages indefi-
nite subjects are allowed. 
3.7 Further focus types 
I have argued that focus in general indicates the presence of alternatives for in-
terpretation. Subtypes of focus then all are variations of this underlying idea. We 
have distinguished between expression focus and denotation focus according to 
the nature of the items in focus, and we have distinguished between pragmatic 
focus and semantic focus according to the general ways in which focus-induced 
alternatives are used – whether they make a truth-conditional difference or not. 
There are a number of additional criteria that can be applied to classify either the 
kind of alternatives or their use. 
 Starting with the type of alternatives, we have seen that constituents of 
different sizes can be put into focus: whole sentences, subconstituents like VPs 
or DPs, parts of DPs like adjectives or demonstratives. Sometimes terms like 
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broad and narrow focus are used (cf. Selkirk 1984, Lambrecht 1994), but it 
should be clear that these are imprecise terms that can only be applied when dif-
ferent focus alternatives are under discussion. The position of the accent is 
determined by rules of accent percolation (also known as ‘focus projection’), 
which leads to well-known ambiguities of focus marking (cf. Gussenhoven 
1983, 1992, Selkirk 1984, 1995). For example, if a transitive VP is in focus then 
accent is realized on the argument, which also would signal narrow focus on the 
argument. For denotation focus it holds that whatever is in focus must be a 
meaningful unit, as denotational focus contrasts different meanings. An extreme 
case is so-called verum focus, focus on the truth value of a sentence, which may 
be expressed by accenting an auxiliary (as in She DOES like broccoli). It is an 
interesting issue whether parts of words can be put in focus. Paul (1880) has 
proposed this for a word like fahren ‘to move in a land-bound vehicle’, where 
according to him it is possible that only the manner component is in focus, 
which is phonologically indistinguishable from focus on the whole denotation. I 
think that cases like this do not force us to lexical decomposition; we can also 
assume that the alternatives are restricted to denotations of verbs of locomotion 
like fahren, gehen, reiten. Another type of sublexical focus is illustrated in We 
only saw stalagMITES in the cave, no stalagTITES, where the accent highlights 
a part does not carry meaning. As Artstein (2005) argues, this can be explained 
by a principle stating that accent creates maximally distinct representations for 
the focus and its alternatives.  
 It sometimes happens that one operator makes use of a combination of 
foci, resulting in complex focus: 
(28)  John only introduced BILL to SUE. 
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This says: The only pair %x, y& such that John introduced x to y is %BILL, SUE&. It 
cannot be reduced to single foci; in particular, the sentence means something 
different from the following: 
(29)  John only introduced BILL only to SUE. 
 
(29) is a case of multiple focus, in which in one and the same sentence, one ex-
pression introduces alternatives that are exploited in one way, and another 
expression introduces alternatives that are exploited in a different way. (29) can 
be paraphrased as: The only x such that John introduced x to Sue and no one 
else is x = Bill. The first only scopes over the second, and this is reflected by fo-
cus marking: Accent on Bill is stronger than accent on Sue, in contrast to the 
complex focus case of (28), where both accents are felt to be equally strong.  
 Another distinction relating to types of alternatives concerns the issue of 
the size of the alternative set. Sometimes this set is limited to a few items, per-
haps down to the minimal number of two, the item in focus and one alternative. 
This is often the case in corrections or contrasts, in polarity questions that expect 
a positive or a negative answer, or in answers to alternative questions or re-
stricted constituent questions such as the following:  
(30)  A: What do you want to drink, tea or coffee?  
B: I want [TEA]F.  
 
At other times the alternative set is unrestricted, satisfying just the general con-
dition that all the alternatives must be compatible with the focus in their 
semantic type. It is tempting to call focus with a limited set of alternatives con-
trastive (as suggested by Chafe 1976), but (30.B) doesn’t seem to be more 
contrastive than an answer to the non-restricted question What do you want to 
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drink? I would rather suggest to distinguish between closed alternatives and 
open alternatives, and talk about closed vs. open focus, when necessary.  
 The notion of contrastive focus I would like to restrict to focus used for 
truly contrastive purposes, which presupposes that the CG content contains a 
proposition with which the current utterance can be constructed, or that such a 
proposition can be accommodated (cf. Jacobs 1988). In (30), it is CG manage-
ment, not CG content that contains such a proposition. The typical use of 
contrastive focus is corrective, but it can also be additive, as in A: John wants 
coffee. B: MAry wants coffee, TOO. There is evidence for particular marking 
strategies for contrastive focus like the use of particular syntactic positions or of 
special prosodic patterns, see e.g. Selkirk (2002), Molnár (2001), Gussenhoven 
(2004). 
 Another type of focus that refers to the specific interpretation of the alter-
native’s contribution is exhaustive focus. It indicates that the focus denotation is 
the only one that leads to a true proposition, or rather more general: that the fo-
cus denotation is the logically strongest that does so. É. Kiss (1998) has pointed 
out that focus movement in Hungarian triggers this specific meaning, and it ap-
pears that cleft constructions in English trigger it as well: 
(31)  It’s [JOHN and BILL]F that stole a cookie. 
 
This example says that nobody else but John and Bill stole a cookie. Conse-
quently, exhaustive focus is not compatible with additive particles, like too. I do 
not see a good reason to introduce, in addition to exhaustive focus, the notion of 
identification focus that expresses an identity statement, as in The ones who 
stole a cookie are John and Bill. 
 As a final focus type I would like to mention scalar focus, also called 
emphatic focus. In this case, the alternatives are ordered, and the focus denota-
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tion often is the least or greatest element. Scalar particles like even or at least 
require scalar focus, as well as strong polarity items such as in [Wild HORses]F 
wouldn’t drag me there.  
3.8 Representation formats for focus 
There are a number of ways in which the alternatives introduced by focus can be 
represented within a formal framework of semantic interpretation. These repre-
sentations are not independent of the possible interpretations of focus, and hence 
should be discussed here. 
 Alternative Semantics (Rooth 1985, 1992) assumes two levels of interpre-
tation, the ordinary level and the level of alternatives. They are construed in 
parallel, and operators that exploit focus refer to both the ordinary meaning and 
the alternatives. The construction mechanism is particularly simple and incorpo-
rates the idea of focus introducing alternatives in a natural way, in the sense that 
it could not even represent anything else besides alternatives. The theory also 
predicts that focus-sensitive operators have to be in a position in which they can 
scope over their focus.6 However, Alternative Semantics has only limited means 
to express that two foci belong together, as in the case of complex focus, and it 
is insufficient in certain cases of multiple focus (cf. von Stechow 1990, Kratzer 
1994, Krifka 2001). The reason is that in Alternative Semantics, the focus deno-
tations are not directly accessible to focus-sensitive operators; the operators can 
only access the effects that the focus alternatives had on the meanings of expres-
sions. The set of alternatives of the following example with a complex focus is a 
set of propositions: 
                                         
6  This does not necessarily hold for the version of Rooth (1992), where focus is mediated via 
anaphoric relations. 
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(32)  [John introduced BILLF to SUEF]. 
Meaning: INTRODUCED(BILL)(SUE)(JOHN) 
Alternatives: {INTRODUCED(x)(y)(JOHN) | x,y # D} 
           = {INTRODUCED(BILL)(SUE)(JOHN),  
              INTRODUCED(BILL)(MARY)(JOHN),  
              INTRODUCED(JIM)(SUE)(JOHN), 
              INTRODUCED(JIM)(MARY)(JOHN), …} 
 
The Structured Meaning approach to focus (von Stechow 1990, Krifka 1992) as-
sumes that focusing leads to a partition of meanings into a focus part and a 
background part that, when applied to the focus denotation, yields the ordinary 
interpretation. Example (32) would get the following representation, where 
background and focus are represented by a pair, %B, F&. 
(33)  %'%x,y&[INTRODUCED(x)(y)(JOHN)], %BILL, SUE&& 
 
The notion of background corresponds to the one of presupposition skeleton of 
Jackendoff (1972); notice that there is no corresponding notion within Alterna-
tive Semantics. The structuring can be triggered by syntactic movement of the 
focus item, as overtly done in focus movement, or by some equivalent operation. 
The Structured Meaning representation can express multiple focus and complex 
focus, but the representation format is not particularly tied to the notion of alter-
natives. It has to be stipulated that focus-sensitive operators are only allowed to 
express operations that relate a focus denotation to its alternatives (cf. Rooth 
1995, who discusses this problem with a hypothetical verbal predicate, tolfed). 
 There is another framework of focus representation, In-Situ Binding Se-
mantics, as developed in Wold (1996), whose representational complexity lies in 
between Alternative Semantics and Structured Meanings.  It does not allow di-
rect access to the focus denotation, but has a notion of background that makes it 
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possible to refer to the position in which foci are interpreted, and hence is able to 
express dependencies between foci.  
 It might well be that we need more than one representation format to 
cover different aspects of focus. In particular, we might argue that focus marked 
by overt movement into a cleft position or dedicated focus position should be 
captured by Structured Meanings as this reflects the syntactic structures in-
volved and thus predicts certain syntactic island restrictions. It is an open debate 
whether cases of in-situ focus should to be modeled by covert movement on LF, 
as the Structured Meaning approach does. On the one hand, it was pointed out 
early on that syntactic island restrictions in association with focus phenomena 
appear to be lacking (cf. Jackendoff 1972); on the other hand, it has been argued 
that they are in fact present (Drubig 1994). The discussion revolves around ex-
amples of the following kind: 
(34)  John didn’t introduced Bill to [the woman he met at SUE’s party] 
(but *MAry’s / the woman he met at MAry’s party). 
 
It appears that the negation associates with focus on Sue, violating island restric-
tions. But then the but-phrase has to take up the whole constituent, not just the 
focus. This has been taken as evidence that the negation associates with the 
whole bracketed NP, not with Sue. We can distinguish between a focus phrase 
(here, the woman he met at SUE’sF party) that contains a focus, which in turn 
determines the alternatives to the focus phrase. In the majority of cases, focus 
and focus phrase coincide, but not always, as (34) illustrates. As the focus can 
be deeply embedded within the focus phrase, this suggests a hybrid representa-
tion of focus: The relation between focus and focus phrase is mediated by the 
mechanisms of Alternative Semantics, and the relation between focus phrase 
and focus-sensitive operator is mediated by Structured Meanings (cf. Krifka 
2006).  
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4 Givenness 
4.1 What is Givenness? 
We now turn to the second important category of IS, the indication that the de-
notation of an expression is present in the immediate CG content. Givenness 
was prominently treated by Chafe (1976), and there is ample evidence that hu-
man languages have devices with which speakers can make addressees aware 
that something that is present in the immediate linguistic context is taken up 
again. 
 A definition of Givenness must be such that it allows us to say that an ex-
pression is given to a particular degree, e.g. whether it is maximally salient in 
the immediate CG or just given there, or whether it is given in the general CG or 
not given at all. The following attempt at a general definition accounts for that 
distinction.  
(35)  A feature X of an expression !  is a Givenness feature iff X indicates 
whether the denotation of !  is present in the CG or not, and/or indi-
cates the degree to which it is present in the immediate CG. 
 
With Focus we distinguished between expression focus and denotation focus. 
We do not have to make this distinction here, as Givenness always refers to de-
notations, never to expressions.  There are two groups of phenomena that refer 
to Givenness, namely specific anaphoric expressions that have givenness fea-
tures as part of their lexical specification, and other grammatical devices such as 
deaccentuation, ordering and deletion that can mark arbitrary constituents as 
given. I will deal with them in turn.   
4.2 Anaphoric expressions 
These are specific linguistic forms that indicate the givenness status of their de-
notations, including personal pronouns, clitics and person inflection, demon-
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stratives, definite articles, but also indefinite articles that indicate that their ref-
erent is not given. Definite articles can be used to indicate whether a denotation 
is given in a CG in general, whereas clitics and pronouns typically indicate that 
their denotations are given in the immediate CG.  
 There is a large literature on anaphoric devices, which I cannot even start 
to do justice here. But I want to point out that speakers typically have a hierar-
chy of distinct linguistic means at their disposal (as zero forms, clitics, 
pronouns, demonstratives…), and that denotations in the immediate CG are 
ranked with respect to their givenness status such that simpler anaphoric expres-
sions are used to refer to more salient denotations (cf. Prince 1981, Gundel et al. 
1993). This insight has been implemented within Centering Theory, which has 
developed formal means to model the dynamic change of the saliency of dis-
course referents in communication (cf. papers in Walker et al. 1998).  
4.3 Deaccentuation, deletion and word order 
There are three other ways to indicate Givenness: Deaccentuation, the reduction 
of the prosodic realization of expressions that are given in the immediate con-
text; deletion, which can be seen as an extreme form of reduction; and the 
realization of an expression in a non-canonical position, typically before the ca-
nonical position. This is illustrated in the following examples: 
(36) a.  Ten years after John inherited an old farm, he SOLD [the shed]Given. 
 b.   Bill went to Greenland, and Mary did _ too. 
 c.  Bill showed the boy a girl. 
  * Bill showed a boy the girl.  
Bill showed the girl to a boy. 
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In the first example, which corresponds to examples used by Umbach (2003), 
the shed is deaccented, and has to be understood as referring to the farm 
mentioned before. If it were not deaccented, it would mean something different, 
like the shed that came with the farm. Example (b) illustrates VP ellipsis, which 
refers back to a VP meaning. The examples in (c) show that in the double object 
construction, given constituents precede constituents that are new. This is a rule 
with high functional load in so-called free word order languages, an insight that 
goes back to Weil (1844).  
 As focus constituents typically are not given, and are realized with greater 
prosodic prominence, it has been proposed that focus is a complementary notion 
to givenness so that the latter can ultimately be eliminated from theoretical ter-
minology (cf. Dane 1970, Sgall et al. 1986). But given constituents can be in 
focus, and then bear accent. For example, it is possible to focus on pronouns, as 
in Mary only saw[HIM]F. Schwarzschild (1999) develops a more refined theory 
of interaction between givenness and focusation, which checks givenness recur-
sively and states that constituents not in focus must be given, and that focus has 
to be applied only when necessary, that is, to prevent that a constituent is given. 
But while focus is restricted in Schwarzschild’s theory, it cannot be eliminated 
totally. 
 We have to assume both focus — the indication of alternatives, which is 
expressed by accentuation — and rules of marking given constituents, e.g. by 
deaccentuation. As the case of accented pronouns shows, focus accentuation 
overrides deaccentuation of given constituents, in the sense that focus has to be 
expressed by accent. However, if a larger constituent is focused, then givenness 
can influence the accent rules: The constituent that normally would bear accent 
can be deaccented, and accent can be realized on some other constituent within 
the focus expression (cf. Féry & Samek-Lodovici 2006). For example, while in 
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VP focus the accent is normally realized on the argument, it is realized on the 
head when the argument is given: 
(37)  A: I know that John stole a cookie. What did he do then? 
B: He [reTURNED [the cookie]Given]Focus. 
 
This suggests an explanation why accent is normally realized on the argument in 
cases of wide focus. It is the arguments, not the heads, that are referential, and 
therefore the need to express whether they refer to something given is more 
pressing. If the normal accentuation rules state that accent is realized on the ar-
gument, then givenness of arguments can be expressed by deaccenting the 
argument and accenting the head instead.  
5 Topics 
5.1 What is Topic? 
The terms ‘topic’ and ‘comment’ are used most frequently to refer to what has 
been introduced into linguistic thinking as ‘psychological subject’ and ‘psycho-
logical predicate’ by von der Gabelentz (1869), who used the first term to refer 
to the object which the speaker is thinking about, and the second to refer to what 
the speaker is thinking about it. In terms related more closely to communication, 
topic is the entity that a speaker identifies about which then information, the 
comment, is given. This presupposes that information in human communication 
and memory is organized in a certain way so that it can be said to be ‘about’ 
something. This does not follow from a general definition of information. For 
example, relational databases or sets of possible worlds, both models for infor-
mation, do not presuppose any relation of aboutness. 
 Reinhart (1982) has integrated this notion of topic into a theory of com-
munication that makes use of the notion of CG. According to her, new 
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information is not just added to the CG content in form of unstructured proposi-
tions, but is rather associated with entities, just like information in a file card 
system is associated with file cards that bear a particular heading. For example, 
while (38.a,b) express the same proposition, they structure it differently insofar 
as (a) should be stored as information about Aristotle Onassis, whereas (b) 
should be stored as information about Jacqueline Kennedy. 
(38) a.  [Aristotle Onassis] Topic [married Jacqueline Kennedy]Comment. 
 b.  [Jacqueline Kennedy]Topic [married Aristotle Onassis]Comment.  
 
This leads to the following definition, which presupposes a file-card like struc-
ture of information storage.  
(39)  The topic constituent identifies the entity or set of entities  
under which the information expressed in the comment constituent 
should be stored in the CG content.  
 
Just as with the notion of ‘focus’, the notion of ‘topic’ has not been used in a 
terminologically clean way. Chafe (1976) called what is defined in (39) ‘sub-
ject’, a term that should be reserved for grammatical subjects to avoid confusion. 
Vallduví (1992) and Vallduví & Engdahl (1996) have used the term ‘link’. In 
the Prague School, the notion of topic is called ‘theme’, and conflated with the 
one of old information (e.g., Dane 1970). We should refrain from this, even if 
in many cases, topic constituents are ‘old’ in the sense of being inferable from 
the context. But there are certainly cases of new topics. The following sentence 
introduces a new entity into discourse and, at the same time, uses it as the deno-
tation of a topic constituent, which amounts to introducing a new file card in the 
CG content.  
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(40)  [A good friend of mine]Topic [married Britney Spears last year]Comment. 
 
The notions of Topic/Comment are sometimes mixed up with the notions of 
Background/Focus. However, as we will see in section 5.2, there are topics that 
contain a focus. And the Comment need not be identical to the focus either: 
(41)  A: When did [Aristotle Onassis]Topic marry Jacqueline Kennedy? 
B: [He]Topic [married her [in 1968]Focus]]Comment. 
 
The definition in (39) includes the option that a comment is made about a set of 
entities. This accounts for the typical way quantified sentences are interpreted, 
in which two sets are related by a quantifier that can be realized as a determiner 
or as an adverbial: 
(42) a.  Every zebra in the zoo was sick. 
 b.  Most zebras in the zoo were sick. 
(43)  Zebras in the zoo usually are sick. 
 
The quantifier in such sentences expresses the extent to which the comment 
holds for the elements of the set. Assuming that sentences like (42), (43) are 
about zebras explains why natural language quantifiers are conservative, that is, 
why the truth value of sentences that contain a quantifier can be checked by 
looking solely at the restrictor set (here the set of zebras). It is important to note 
that the restrictor of quantifiers is not always topical, but in the majority of cases 
it is, and the property of conservativity that is motivated in those cases is trans-
ferred to cases in which quantifiers are not topical.  
 Sentences typically have only one topic, which can be explained within 
Reinhart’s file-card metaphor: The simplest way to add information is to add it 
on one file card. But sentences with two or more topics are possible under cer-
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tain circumstances, in case a relation between two file cards is expressed, as in 
As for Jack and Jill, they married last year. A possible way to handle such cases 
is to introduce a new file card that contains information concerning both Jack 
and Jill. On the other hand, sentences may have no topic constituent at all, under 
which condition they are called thetic, following Marty (1884). But as already 
Marty had indicated, this does not mean that such sentences are about nothing. 
While they lack a topic constituent, they do have a topic denotation, typically a 
situation that is given in the context, as in [The HOUSE is on fire]Comment.  
 In addition to the notion topic/comment, some theories also assume a 
structuring into subject and predicate, or predication basis and predicate, cf. 
Sasse (1987), Jacobs (2001) and Kuroda (2005). I will not go into this distinc-
tion here in greater detail, but I doubt that it is a distinction that is to be 
explained as one of IS.  
 But then the question is whether topic and comment should be considered 
terms relating to IS at all. Without question, topic/comment structure is a pack-
aging phenomenon; (38.a) and (b) package the same information differently, so 
that it is entered on the file card for Aristotle Onassis and for Jacqueline Ken-
nedy, respectively. But section 2.1 stressed that the packaging must respond to 
the temporary (recent) common ground, and this restriction certainly is not al-
ways satisfied. Assume that two speakers A, B meet who both know John well, 
and A says to B: Did you know? John has married last week. This is an assertion 
about John; the information will be entered in the file card for John in the CG 
content of A and B. But this does not necessarily relate to the recent state of the 
CG content, it can also respond to the long-term state, e.g. a long established and 
known interest of B in John.   
 Yet we find that topic choice often does respond to properties of the tem-
porary information state. There is a well-documented tendency to keep the topic 
constant over longer stretches of discourse (so-called topic chains, cf. Givón 
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1983). Hence, while the notions of topic and comment fail to be IS terms in the 
sense that they always relate to the temporary state of the CG, they do quite of-
ten do relate to it, as the topic denotation in the preceding utterance is the first 
choice for the topic denotation of the present utterance.  
5.2 Contrastive Topics 
Contrastive topics are topics with a rising accent, as in B’s answer in (44). They 
arguably do not constitute an information-packaging category in their own right, 
but represent a combination of topic and focus, as indicated in the example, in 
the following sense: They consist of an aboutness topic that contains a focus, 
which is doing what focus always does, namely indicating an alternative. In this 
case, it indicates an alternative aboutness topics.  
(44)  A: What do your siblings do? 
B: [My [SISter]Focus]Topic [studies MEDicine]Focus,  
   and [my [BROther]Focus]Topic is [working on a FREIGHT ship]Focus.  
 
In the first clause of B’s response, focus on sister indicates an alternative to the 
topic ‘my sister’, namely, ‘my brother’. The typical reason why the presence of 
an alternative is highlighted is to indicate that the present clause does not deliver 
all the information that is expected. This is why we often find contrastive topics 
to indicate a strategy of incremental answering in the CG management, as in our 
example in which an issue is split into sub-issues. This has been assumed to be 
the function of contrastive topics in Roberts (1996) and Büring (1997, 2003). It 
is pointed out in this literature that there are accommodation phenomena that af-
fect what we call CG management. In the following case, contrastive topic 
accommodates a more general question, Who was where? 
(45)  A: Where were you (at the time of the murder)? 
B: [[I]Focus]Topic [was [at HOME]Focus]Comment. 
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However, it should be noted that we find contrastive topics also in cases in 
which the idea of a questioning strategy is not easily applicable. In example (46) 
the answer given does not satisfy the expectations expressed in the question, in 
combination with a rising intonation in the comment that indicates that the asser-
tion, while being the best one to be made, may not satisfy all needs. 
(46)  A: Does your sister speak Portuguese? 
B: [My [BROther]Focus]Topic [[DOES]Focus]Comment. 
 
It should be noted that focus within a topic is interpreted as usual: indicating the 
presence of alternatives, in this case, alternative topics. Focus is marked by (ris-
ing) accent, but it is not the main accent of the sentence, which is on a 
constituent of the comment.  
6 Frame Setting and Delimitation 
6.1 What is frame setting? 
Frame setting, according to Jacobs (2001), is often not separated clearly from 
aboutness topic, and Chafe (1976), who stresses their difference, uses the term 
‘topic’ for precisely this function. What is it? Statements like (47) certainly 
should not be entered under a file card about the health situation, and the topic 
of (48) is Daimler-Chrysler, not Germany or America. 
(47)  A: How is John? 
B: {Healthwise / As for his health}, he is [FINE]Focus.   
(48)  A: How is business going for Daimler-Chrysler? 
B: [In GERmany]Frame the prospects are [GOOD]Focus,  
   but [in AMErica]Frame they are [losing MOney]Focus. 
 
Krifka 46 
It is often said that adverbials like healthwise or in Germany are frame setters 
that set the frame in which the following expression should be interpreted; Ac-
cording to Chafe, frame setting is used “to limit the applicability of the main 
predication to a certain restricted domain”. It is still unclear how this should be 
understood more precisely. For cases like (47) which contain an evaluative 
predicate (fine) that is unspecified with respect to the dimension of evaluation 
(financially, healthwise, spiritually etc.), this can be rendered more precisely by 
assuming that it is the task of the frame-setting adverbial to specify that dimen-
sion.  Similarly, (48) has a situation dimension that is specified by the frame 
setter. But we also have statements like As for his health situation, he had a by-
pass operation recently, which cannot be explained in this way. It appears that 
frame setters indicate the general type of information that can be given about an 
individual. A possible implementation of this idea is that they systematically re-
strict the language (the notions that can be expressed) in certain ways: notions 
like he won a lot of money cannot be interpreted in the scope of healthwise, and 
notions like he is doing fine have to be restricted to the indicated dimension. 
 In any case, in dialogues like (47) alternative frames play a role, and 
hence we can assume that explicit frame setters always are focused in the sense 
of section 3.1. They choose one out of a set of frames and state that the proposi-
tion holds within this frame. If there is no alternative perspective to be 
considered, then there is no need for an explicit frame setter either. As explicit 
frame setters always indicate alternatives, they clearly belong to IS. More spe-
cifically, they relate to CG management, as they imply that there are other 
aspects for which other predications might hold. In this they are similar to con-
trastive topics (section 5.2), as they too split up a complex issue into sub-issues.  
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6.2 Delimitation 
The similarity between contrastive topics and frame setters mentioned above is 
worth to be looked at more closely. What contrastive topics and frame setters 
have in common is that they express that, for the communicative needs at the 
current point of discourse, the present contribution only gives a limited or in-
complete answer. In the case of contrastive topics, the current CG management 
contains the expectation that information about a more comprehensive, or dis-
tinct, entity is given; contrastive topic indicates that the topic of the sentence 
diverges from this expectation. With frame setters, the current CG management 
contains the expectation that information of a different, e.g. more comprehen-
sive, type is given, and the frame setter indicates that the information actually 
provided is restricted to the particular dimension specified. This more general 
view is suggested in Büring’s notion of contrastive topics, which do not have to 
be topics in the sense of aboutness topics. 
 Büring develops a formal model of this notion within the representation 
framework of Alternative Semantics: The contrastive topic induces a set of al-
ternatives over and above the set of alternatives that are introduced by the focus 
within the predication, ending up with sets of sets of alternatives.  
(49)  A: Which subjects do your siblings study? 
B: [My SISter]Contrastive Topic [Comment studies [PoMOlogy]Focus]] 
   ={{x STUDIES y | y # {POMOLOGY, OLERICULTURE, …}  
      | x # {SISTER, BROTHER, …}} 
={{SISTER STUDIES POMOLOGY, SISTER STUDIES OLERICULTURE, …}, 
   {BROTHER STUDIES POMOLOGY, BROTHER STUDIES OLERICULTURE, …}} 
 
This incorporates the important observation that contrastive topics always occur 
in expressions that have another focus outside of the contrastive topic, a rule that 
holds for frame setters as well. But one should distinguish the formal implemen-
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tation of delimitation from its communicative purpose. The following is an at-
tempt to characterize this in a most general way: 
(50)  A Delimitator !  in an expression […! ...(Focus…] always comes with 
a focus within !  that generates alternatives !" . It indicates that the 
current informational needs of the CG are not wholly satisfied by 
[…!…(Focus…], but would be satisfied by additional expressions of 
the general form […!"…("Focus…]. 
 
In this definition, no reference to (aboutness) topic or frame setting is made. 
This allows for cases like (51) that do not plausibly belong to either category: 
(51)  [An [inGEnious] mathematician]Delim he is [NOT]Focus. 
 
The sentence suggests alternative statements like He is a mediocre mathemati-
cian hold. The definition in (50) is also neutral as to the speech act type of the 
expression, which explains why delimitations occur in questions and commands 
as in (52): 
(52)  And when did you read [DostoYEVsky]Delim in school? 
 
Delimitation indicates that the respective question does not express the full 
communicative needs as there are other questions at issue, such as When did you 
read Shakespeare in school? 
 If delimitations do what they are suggested to do here, then this explains 
why they often help to indicate a certain questioning strategy. If it is explicitly 
marked that an expression is suboptimal as far as the communicative needs of 
the moment are concerned, then one important reason for this is that the current 
communicative move only responds to a local need, and not yet to the global 
need of the CG. By this they help to structure CG management by distinguishing 
between local and more global communicative goals.  
Basic Notions of Information Structure 49 
7 Cohesion and rhetorical structure 
The notion of a structured set of questions under discussion that has been devel-
oped by a variety of researchers, such as Klein & von Stutterheim (1987), van 
Kuppevelt (1994), Roberts (1996) and Büring (2003), leads to a richer under-
standing of CG management. We have seen that delimiters can create and 
respond to such structures.  
 I would like to point out that beyond the idea of question stacks and ques-
tion trees, linguistic communication is built on a rich structure of discourse 
relations, as investigated in a number of theories such as in the study of cohesion 
in Halliday & Hasan (1976), and in Rhetorical Structure Theory (Mann & 
Thompson 1988). Structured Discourse Representation Theory, as developed in 
Asher & Lascarides (2004), shows that there is an interaction between discourse 
structure and possible anaphoric relations. CG management cannot be described 
without referring to the strategies used to narrate events or make arguments. For 
example, there are strategies that first lay out the premises and then lead to a 
conclusion, and there are others that start with the conclusion and then motivate 
it or elaborate on it. This will result in locally distinct structures of the CG, and 
each individual sentence will respond to those. In this sense, the devices studied 
in these theories, like discourse particles and intonational meaning, squarely be-
long to Information Structure as envisioned by Chafe.  
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